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Abstract: Israel Kirzner has been one of the leaders in fashioning an Austrian school of 
economics. In his rendering of the Austrian school, one finds a marriage between 
Friedrich Hayek’s discourse with Ludwig von Mises’s deductive, praxeological image of 
science of Ludwig von Mises—a marriage that seems to us somewhat forced. The 
Misesian image of science stakes its claims to scientific status on purported axioms and 
categorical, 100-percent deductive truths, as well as the supposed avoidance of any 
looseness in evaluative judgments. In keeping with the praxeological style of discourse, 
Kirzner claims that his notion of coordination can be used as a clear-cut criterion of 
economic goodness. Kirzner wishes to claim that gainful entrepreneurial action in the 
market is always coordinative. We contend that Kirzner’s efforts to be categorical and to 
avoid looseness are unsuccessful. We argue that looseness inheres in the economic 
discussion of the most important things, and associate that viewpoint with Adam Smith. 
We suggest that Hayek is much closer to Smith than to Mises, and that Kirzner’s 
invocations of Hayek’s discussions of coordination are spurious. In denying looseness 
and trying to cope with the brittleness of categorical claims, Kirzner becomes abstruse. 
His discourse erupts with problems. Kirzner has erred in rejecting the understanding of 
coordination held by Hayek, Ronald Coase, and their contemporaries in the field at large. 
Kirzner’s refraining from the looser Smithian perspective stems from his devotion to 
Misesianism. Beyond all the criticism, however, we affirm the basic thrust of what 
Kirzner says about economic processes. Once we give up the claim that voluntary 
profitable activity is always or necessarily coordinative, and once we make peace with 
the aesthetic aspect of the idea of concatenate coordination, the basic claims of Kirzner 
can be salvaged: Voluntary profitable activity is usually coordinative, and government 
intervention is usually discoordinative. But the Misesian image of science must be 
dropped. 
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Israel Kirzner on Coordination and Discovery 
 
Israel Kirzner is best known for his work on the role of discovery and 
entrepreneurship in economic affairs. He sees entrepreneurial alertness as the vital human 
faculty to apprehend opportunities for one’s betterment. Entrepreneurial discovery entails 
interpretive shifts and awakenings. It goes beyond the deliberate search for or mechanical 
response to new information. Kirzner’s insights about discovery make a contrast to the 
kind of economics that regards human beings as interpretively flat and fixed—that is, 
working within an unchanging understanding of own ends and means. Game theory 
typically assumes common knowledge—interpretational symmetry throughout the 
“game.” Knowledge is flattened down to information: there is no heterogeneity of 
interpretations and no role for judgment over interpretations. If economists confine their 
thinking to stories of final and symmetric interpretation, they will under-appreciate the 
role of discovery and entrepreneurship in economic affairs. More specifically, they will 
fail to do justice to laissez-faire (Kirzner 1985). 
Kirzner strives to integrate his discovery ideas into theories of market 
coordination. Refining ideas at both ends—discovery and coordination—Kirzner works 
to maintain that, in market activity, successful voluntary entrepreneurial action 
necessarily enhances coordination.  
Our attitude toward Kirzner is great admiration mixed with frustration and regret. 
We embrace the central teachings—notably, that successful entrepreneurship and 
voluntary activity more generally usually enhance coordination, and, even more typcially, 
that restrictions on voluntary activity diminish coordination. We are thoroughly 
supportive of those broad themes developed and expounded by Kirzner.   2 
We feel, however, that Kirzner has made errors. Our impetus is to strengthen the 
central teachings by identifying and correcting the errors. Greater robustness of the 
central claims—that entrepreneurship, that freedom conduces to better coordination—is 
achieved by two sorts of changes. First, in certain respects the claim must be weakened. 
Kirzner makes “always”- or “necessarily”-type claims—categorical claims—where, 
rather, the claims should be “usually” or “by and large.” Second, changes are needed in 
the formulation and semantics. Suitably tailored, the chief messages still ring out but 
become looser. Broadly speaking, our approach is greater robustness through greater 
looseness. 
If we basically agree with Kirzner’s teachings, why the disagreements? We begin 
by offering a broad interpretation of why Kirzner would develop the ideas in ways we 
deem erroneous. 
 
Mises, Kirzner, and the Project of Austrianism 
Kirzner has been a leader in building an Austrian identity within economics.  The 
narrative makes Ludwig von Mises the central figure of the Austrian tradition, although 
the tradition is said to originate with Carl Menger.  In Kirzner’s view, Friedrich Hayek 
also looms large, but Hayek is thought to develop the economics of Mises. Kirzner and 
his followers tend to homogenize Hayek and Mises. 
Although Mises and Kirzner declare their economics to be “value free” (or 
“wertfrei”), it is clear that they believe that economics ought to address the most 
important things, notably major policy issues, and that they believe that the economics 
profession and the public culture poorly appreciate laissez-faire.  It is clear that Mises,   3 
Hayek, and virtually all self-described Austrian economists are motivated to advance 
classical liberalism, but that impetus is not distinctive to Mises, Hayek, and the self-
described Austrians. If there is to be a distinctive Austrian identity, it must draw on other 
elements.  
Kirzner sees Austrian distinctiveness in the praxeology of Mises, who 
propounded a view of economics as a science built on fundamental a priori axioms of 
human action. Mises ascribes to his praxeology a truth status like that of mathematics: 
The theorems attained by correct praxeological reasoning are not only perfectly 
certain and incontestable, like the correct mathematical theorems. They refer, 
moreover, with the full rigidity of their apodictic certainty and incontestability to 
the reality of action as it appears in life and history. Praxeology conveys exact and 
precise knowledge of real things. (Mises 1949, 39) 
 
It is upon a supposed status of axiomatic foundation, logical deduction, and 
apodictic certainty that Mises and those who have promulgated an Austrian identity, led 
by Kirzner and Murray Rothbard (1926-1995), stake their claim for a distinct science of 
economics, a science that happens to support libertarian conclusions. 
Hayek, however, never embraced Mises’s approach and never promulgated an 
Austrian identity. Compared to Mises, Hayek is considerably looser and more 
pragmatic—and pragmatist. We think Hayek is closer to, say, Adam Smith and Edwin 
Cannan, than to Mises. Hayek sees economics not an exact or deductive science but as 
part of the civilization’s general cultural purpose, and hence as framed by the 
civilization’s notions of the good. Hayek (1978a) said: “Mises himself was still much   4 
more a child of the rationalist tradition of the Enlightenment and of continental, rather 
than of English, liberalism…than I am myself.”
1 
“[T]he diverging interests of [Mises and Hayek],” suggest Keith Jakee and Heath 
Spong (2003), “is potentially relevant to the disunity that has surfaced within the Austrian 
school since the 1970s” (473). They relate that divergence to tensions in Kirzner’s 
discourse, particularly between the Misesian image of science and the theories about 
entrepreneurship.
2  
The wing of Austrianism associated more closely with the ideas of Murray 
Rothbard and with the Ludwig von Mises Institute elevates Mises (and Rothbard) clearly 
above the squishy Hayek. In “Mises and Hayek Dehomogenized,” the Rothbardian 
Austrian Joseph T. Salerno (1993) argues that Hayek is importantly different than Mises. 
The wing more associated with Kirzner and Peter Boettke, however, tends to homogenize 
Mises and Hayek. Many of Kirzner’s followers seem to subscribe to the homogenization 
and to Kirzner’s writings on coordination (for example, Ikeda 1990, Thomsen 1992, 
Sautet 2000, Boettke 2001).   
While earning an MBA at New York University during the 1950s, Kirzner 
encountered Mises and his private seminar. Kirzner was captivated and, along with 
Rothbard, became a leading protégé. Working under Mises, Kirzner earned his PhD in 
economics at NYU in 1957. Throughout his career, Kirzner has remained loyal to 
                                                 
1 Hayek made related remarks about Mises’s undue rationalism and emphasis on the a priori in an interview 
published in Hayek on Hayek (Hayek 1994, 72-73) and in his foreword to Mises’s Socialism (Hayek 1978b, 
xxxiii). 
2 There is much congruence between the views of Jakee and Spong (2003) and of us. They are skeptical of 
the homogenization of Mises and Hayek, and would seem to favor Hayek. Also, they repeatedly make an 
issue of a distinction that seems to track ours, presented below, between plan fulfillment and retrospective 
plan affirmation (477 n. 24, 480-81, 482 n. 32). They, however, seem to enter into the dubious practices of 
speaking of equilibrium, equilibration, etc., without reference to a model (e.g., 474-78), and of speaking of 
equilibrium and coordination apparently as though they were interchangeable (e.g., 480).   5 
Mises’s conception of “the pure, universal truths of economic theory” (Kirzner 2001, 56), 
or Mises’ image of science. We contend, like Jakee and Spong (2003, 470-73), that 
Kirzner has been committed to building a distinctive Misesian science of economics.  
Kirzner has produced extensive discourse, in which a central word is 
coordination. Kirzner (2000) writes that coordination is “a clear-cut, objective criterion… 
which may satisfy the intuitive conviction of economists that their science does 
objectively demonstrate the economic ‘goodness’ of some economic policies” (133). 
Thus, for Kirzner, coordination signifies economic goodness. He claims to show that 
voluntary, successful entrepreneurial action in the market necessarily advances 
coordination or is coordinative. Notice the two important features: The claim is 
categorical, or 100 percent—that is the nature of praxeological truth and, to Misesians, 
the mark of economic science. Second, the claim lends support to (though does not seal 
the case for) libertarian policy, for to obstruct such entrepreneurial action, as with 
government restrictions, would be to prevent coordinative actions.  
To our thinking, Mises, Rothbard, and Kirzner are alike in their image of science. 
Coordination does not play a large role in Mises and Rothbard, but Kirzner makes great 
efforts to develop the concept of coordination in order to integrate teachings of economic 
liberalism with Mises’s image of science. In contrast, Smith and Hayek may be said to 
advance the teachings of economic liberalism in ways that mostly avoid modernist 
conceptions of such discourse.  
 
Concatenate Coordination: Hayek, Coase, etc. 
 
Along with other economists of their times, Mises and Hayek used the term 
coordination in the sense of “concatenate coordination,” an appellation used by Klein and   6 
Orsborn (2008) in order to distinguish it from the “mutual coordination” of later 
discourse following Thomas Schelling and game theory. Klein and Orsborn make a 
systematic investigation of how economists have used the term coordination. They 
suggest that, until around 1970, the way that economists used coordination is best 
understood in the following way: A concatenation of activities and resources is 
coordinated to the extent that the concatenation would be satisfying, pleasing, or even 
beautiful to a mind imagined to behold it. Hayek’s usage of coordination nicely fit this 
understanding, but Kirzner (2000, ch. 10) contends that his coordination is true to 
Hayek’s. We wish to disentangle concatenate coordination from some of Kirzner’s 
characterizations of coordination and hence will dwell a bit on concatenate coordination. 
Up to around 1930, the primary economic talk of “coordination,” aside from 
usage in the transportation literature, concerned the concatenation of activities within the 
firm. But in the 1930s a new moment occurs, and the moment may be marked by a 
lecture given by Friedrich A. Hayek in 1933 at the London School of Economics and 
published that year in Economica as “The Trend of Economic Thinking.” Hayek takes 
coordination to the extensive economic cosmos. This step was not entirely novel,
3 but it 
now becomes prominent in Anglo-American economics. The LSE during the 1930s 
seems to have bubbled with talk of coordination beyond the firm.  
In the lecture Hayek extends the idea of concatenate coordination beyond the eye 
of any actual coordinator: 
                                                 
3 Such usage occurs notably by Herbert Spencer, who in First Principles (1862) used the term coordination 
in drawing biological analogies. Besides some writers who made biological analogies similar to those of 
Herbert Spencer, the searches done by Klein and Orsborn find other scattered and fleeting occurrence of 
“coordination” meaning spontaneous concatenate coordination in works by Henry George, John Bates 
Clark, Philip Wicksteed, Ludwig von Mises, David Friday, Lawrence Frank, Raymond Bye, and Shorey 
Peterson. These are shown in the worksheets of the linked Excel file.   7 
From the time of Hume and Adam Smith, the effect of every attempt to 
understand economic phenomena – that is to say, of every theoretical analysis – 
has been to show that, in large part, the co-ordination of individual efforts in 
society is not the product of deliberate planning, but has been brought about, and 
in many cases could only have been brought about, by means which nobody 
wanted or understood, and which in isolation might be regarded as some of the 
most objectionable features of the system. (Hayek 1933a, 129; italics added) 
 
Hayek is describing independent actions that lead to outcomes beyond the actor’s 
intention and comprehension—spontaneous order. Like the concatenate coordination 
within the firm, coordination means desirable arrangement or outcome. But, desirable to 
whom?   
The matter, Hayek emphasizes, calls for great delicacy:  
The limitations of language make it almost impossible to state it without using 
misleading metaphorical words.  The only intelligible form of explanation for 
what I am trying to state would be to say—as we say in German—that there is 
sense [Sinn] in the phenomena; that they perform a necessary function.  But as 
soon as we take such phrases in a literal sense, they become untrue.  It is an 
animistic, anthropomorphic interpretation of phenomena, the main characteristic 
of which is that they are not willed by any mind.  And as soon as we recognize 
this, we tend to fall into an opposite error, which is, however, very similar in 
kind: we deny the existence of what these terms are intended to describe. Hayek 
(1933a, 27; emphasis add to the final sentence) 
 
Hayek would steer us away from that “opposite error.” He suggests that society 
has a “sense” like an “organism.” He even writes that a notion of social organism is 
necessary to economics: “The recognition of the existence of this organism is the 
recognition that there is a subject matter for economics” (1933, 27). Yet he makes these   8 
suggestions with great caution. Classical liberals dread the hazards of any society-as-
organism metaphor.
 4 The lecture is quite remarkable as an early expression of the 
dilemmas in opposing society-as-organization notions while trying to say that liberal 
processes are coordinative. But, coordinative to whom? In the case of the firm, an answer 
is fairly clear—the owners/managers. But for a polycentric spontaneous system, there is 
no tangible analog. 
The way to interpret the “sense” of the social “organism” of which Hayek spoke 
is to think of a fictitious mind able to behold the extensive tapestry of social affairs, in 
principle including future generations, and inclined to judge it in a manner that parties to 
the discourse are presumed to find acceptable. This imagined judge is like that being 
whose hands, according to Adam Smith, are invisible. Alluding to Hume and Smith, 
Hayek too wants to talk about coordination beyond the eye of any actual human 
coordinator. This understanding of coordination comports perfectly with the dictionary 
definition of the transitive verb to coordinate, to put things into a pleasing order or 
arrangement. Necessarily embedded within such understanding are aesthetic or moral 
sensibilities relevant to the interlocutors. The understanding thus involves deep 
dimensions that are, in Adam Smith’s words, “loose, vague, and indeterminate” (1790, 
175, 327).  
In writing of society as organism, Hayek cites the 1923 and 1932 German 
language editions of Mises’ Socialism (1981), which not only affirms the notion of the 
social organism but uses it very extensively (as may be easily confirmed by electronic 
text search). Interestingly, in Mises’s later magnum opus Human Action (1963, 589) there 
                                                 
4 Like Hayek, Simon Newcomb (1886:7-8) articulates cautions while going forward with the organism 
metaphor.   9 
is but a single, insignificant instance of such usage. The disappearance reflects deep 
changes in Mises’s intellectual enterprise; as Kirzner (2001) notes: “Mises’ 
distinctiveness had not yet been firmly established by 1930” (54). Further, it should be 
recalled that Hayek entered intellectual maturity as a mild socialist and a pupil of 
Friedrich von Wieser, whose works burble with notions akin to social organism 
(Shearmur 1996, ch. 2). Hayek (1978a) noted that he had come from Wieser and that 
Mises “gradually, but never completely, won me over.” It is true that Mises converted 
Hayek on economic policy, but there is no reason at all to suppose that Mises drove 
organism metaphors from Hayek’s mind, particularly as at the time Mises himself was 
expounding on them. Hayek said that “[Mises’s] Socialism told us [young idealists] that 
we had been looking for improvement in the wrong direction” (Hayek 1978b, xix)—not 
that the book transformed their idea of improvement.  
Coordination ideas were explored at the LSE by Hayek’s colleagues W.H. Hutt 
(1934), Arnold Plant (1937), and Ronald Coase (1937). Coase posed his problem: “In 
view of the fact that, while economists treat the price mechanism as a co-ordinating 
instrument, they also admit the co-ordinating function of the ‘entrepreneur,’ it is surely 
important to enquire why co-ordination is the work of the price mechanism in one case 
and of the entrepreneur in another” (37). Hayek’s idea of coordination was apparently no 
different from that of Coase and many other economists. Yet Kirzner develops claims 
about coordination that he presents as true to Hayek and part of a distinctively Austrian 
sort of economics. 
 
   10 
Kirzner’s Coordination Often Seems Like Concatenate Coordination 
A great many of Kirzner’s statements about coordination read fine as concatenate 
coordination. Early in his career, he described the price system as a coordinative force in 
society: “Clearly, with innumerable producers making independent decisions as to 
production techniques, the economy must coordinate these decisions so as to ensure that 
each producer uses those resources least needed elsewhere in the economy. …  An 
efficient system will provide sufficient reward to each participant to enable all 
participants to enjoy the benefits of the widest possible range of resource services” (1963, 
38). Elsewhere, Kirzner writes: “Within the firm, activities are co-ordinated by central 
direction, not by market competition via a price mechanism” (1992, 161).  
Indeed, we find Kirzner articulating the construct of a mind imagined to behold 
the vast concatenation and its potentialities, as when he writes that the actions of buyers 
and sellers who have not noticed certain profit opportunities “are, from the perspective of 
omniscience, uncoordinated and inconsistent” (1985, 59; italics added), or when speaking 
of coordinating traffic flow: “Were an omniscient single mind to make the decisions for 
all the drivers, that mind might arrange the drivers’ actions in a smooth and safe fashion” 
(1992, 140; first italics added).  
Because we believe that concatenate coordination conforms to the coordination 
discussed by Herbert Spencer, Simon Newcomb, Mises, Hayek, Coase, and hundreds of 
others, we think it is significant that a great many of Kirzner’s utterances about 
coordination might be read that way. It gives the reader the impression that Kirzner is 
adhering to conventional usage, and it allows Austrians to speak to wider audiences. Our 
view, again, is that the coordination talk among Austrians ought to become sensibly   11 
about concatenate coordination—but, again, doing so would upset their claim to 
distinctiveness in the matter. In earlier work, Klein (1997a) proposed that Kirzner’s basic 
claims be understood as by-and-large claims about concatenate coordination, but this 
proposal was vigorously resisted by Kirzner (2000, 132-148, 199). 
Kirzner’s Troubled Claims about Coordination 
Kirzner’s discourse has come to center around “coordination.” Kirzner introduces 
and attempts to reconcile a jumble of claims about coordination. Before addressing the 
problems, we lay out the pieces that Kirzner attempts to fit together. 
Two background conditions should be clarified. In speaking of whether economic 
actions are coordinative, Kirzner does not mean burglary, fraud, and other coercive 
actions (e.g., Kirzner 1992b, 93); he confines the discourse to voluntary action. Second, 
Kirzner means entrepreneurial action that is successful, in the sense that the agent does 
not feel that his entrepreneurial action was an error but rather that it was gainful. Kirzner 
acknowledges that actors may make losses and feel regret, and that such voluntary acts 
might be discoordinative. His statements concern the coordinative aspects of the 
successful entrepreneurial seizing of gainful opportunities (e.g., Kirzner 1992, 21-31). 
Kirzner is on solid ground in supposing that markets do not tend toward specific agent 
errors, and do tend to weed out each loss-making activity and to correct agent errors 
(2000, 31), so it is appropriate to focus on successful entrepreneurial action in 
characterizing market tendencies. Although there are issues about which actions are to be 
deemed entrepreneurial, we, too, mean such actions that are voluntary and successful.  
 
   12 
“Every entrepreneurial gain is coordinative” 
The great virtue of Kirzner’s coordination discourse is the emphasis he places on 
discovery, on the idea that new discoveries of gainful activities represent advances in 
coordination—a point too often neglected by formalistic economists and by 
interventionists who presume that regulators can know the economy and its potentialities 
well enough to manipulate it beneficially. We salute Kirzner (1992) when he writes that 
entrepreneurial discoveries constitute “steps through which markets tend to achieve co-
ordination, gradually replacing earlier states of widespread mutual ignorance by 
successively better co-ordinated states of society” (151). Concatenate coordination will 
typically recognize such discovery as coordination: A humane liberal mind imagined to 
behold the vast tapestry and its potentialities normally will smile upon the discovery of 
such opportunities. 
But the Misesian image of science leads Kirzner to make strong claims about the 
relation between coordination and the discovery of such opportunities. He maintains that 
every instance of discovering and seizing gainful opportunity advances coordination, and, 
inversely, every unexploited opportunity represents a failure in coordination, as instanced 
by the following quotations:  
 
•   “to identify absences of coordination among the plans of market participants 
it is sufficient to identify profit opportunities” (1973, 222; italics added). 
•  “where an unexploited mutually beneficial exchange opportunity for A and B 
exists, the resulting ‘inefficiency’ can be described as an absence of 
coordination” (1973, 216). 
•  Kirzner suggests that all profit opportunities are “created by initial 
discoordination” (2000, 21).   13 
•  Kirzner asserts that market entrepreneurship always advances coordination 
when he refers to “a possibly faulty functioning of the market” as “a 
possibility we have denied” (Kirzner 2000, 86). 
  
So Kirzner frequently says that market entrepreneurship is always coordinative. 
There is another issue worth clarifying before proceeding: In assessing whether an 
entrepreneurial action enhances coordination, what is the comparison? What is the 
hypothetical alternate concatenation? How do we characterize the concatenation without 
the entrepreneurial event? Like Kirzner, we focus on the discovery of opportunity. We 
suggest that usually the most relevant alternate concatenation is to imagine that for some 
adventitious reason the actor misses the opportunity. Imagine that an extraneous, 
unwelcome distraction interrupted the moment of discovery, preventing (or perhaps 
delaying) the actor’s discovery of the opportunity, and, in consequence, after getting past 
the distraction he goes about his affairs without any really useable apprehension or 
formulation of the opportunity—without any sense of having “gotten an idea.” In the case 
of distraction, we don’t know exactly what would happen or how coordinative that world 
would be—possibly, the entrepreneurial action in question would itself have been a 
distraction to an even better discovery, which is now realized by virtue of the 
adventitious distraction that blocks the lesser discovery—after all, there is usually an 
even better opportunity out there. We resort to supposing, however, that without 
discovering the opportunity in question the actor instead carries out actions that are more 
obvious, closer to routine. With Kirzner, we say that there is no tendency to experience 
one discovery when a merely adventitious distraction would have brought one to an even 
better discovery—otherwise people would invite random distractions. It could happen, of   14 
course, but it would be somewhat aberrant. Accordingly, for our perspective as social 
analysts, the “expected” concatenation of the world without the discovery is more 
commonplace than the world with the discovery, more like “the day before” in the 
relevant context. It is a world without the “development” of the new discovery. 
 
“Coordination is the fulfillment or compatibility of plans or expectations” 
Kirzner (2000) characterizes coordination “as the state (or the process leading 
towards the state) in which the individual plans of independently-acting persons display 
mutual compatibility. Such compatibility may be couched, as in the preceding sentence, 
in terms of plans, or it may be couched in terms of decisions, or of expectations” (190). 
He adds, “The fundamental idea in this coordination concept is that we (the economic or 
social scientists) are interested in the extent to which the decisions made by an individual 
correctly anticipate (and take advantage of) the decisions in fact being made by others” 
(2000, 191). 
Elsewhere Kirzner offers the following characterization: “A fully coordinated 
state of affairs, for our purposes, is one in which each action taken by each individual in a 
demarcated set of actions, correctly takes into account (a) the actions in fact being taken 
by everyone else in the set, and (b) the actions which the others might take were one’s 
own actions to be different” (2000, 136; italic added). 
Kirzner inversely characterizes discoordination as involving discordance, 
disappointment, or regret: “disappointment and/or regret…must ultimately ensue from 
patterns of action which incorrectly anticipate and depend upon the actions of others in   15 
the system” (2000, 145); "The entrepreneurial-competitive process becomes visible…as 
discovering and correcting discordant individual plans and decisions" (1973, p. 218). 
Notice that Kirzner has run together two perspectives that entail different sets of 
sentiments. One perspective regards how things go along a chosen plan (or projected path 
of action), the positive sentiment there being fulfillment and the negative being 
frustration or disappointment. The other perspective regards retrospectively the chosen 
path as opposed to some could-have-been alternate path, the positive sentiment being 
affirmation of the choice one made and the negative being regret or self-reproach. For 
example, an employer hires Meg and it all goes fine and as expected, the plan is fulfilled, 
but once the action is irreversible the employer realizes that he could have offered the job 
to Valerie, who likely would have accepted and been better, and he feels he should have 
thought of that. This would be a case of fulfillment of the plan but nonetheless regret and 
an introspective sense of error. Our distinction seems to correspondence to ones 
presented by Jakee and Spong (2003, 477 n. 24, 480-81, 482 n. 32 referring to Jack High 
1982), who argue that Kirzner’s idea of entrepreneurial alertness “becomes overly elastic 
and therefore must carry too much of his argument” (480). We, too, contend that Kirzner 
blurs the distinction, which is elaborated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1:  
Two Perspectives about a Plan: Fulfillment vs. Retrospective Affirmation 
 
  Positive  Negative 
 
Sentiment along the 
path pursued 
 
 
Fulfillment 
Compatibility 
 
Disappointment, 
frustration 
Discord 
 
Sentiment looking 
back on the path 
 
Affirmation 
 
Regret, self-reproach 
 
Error, according to   16 
pursued, as opposed 
to some alternate path 
Klein (1999) and 
sometimes Kirzner 
 
Kirzner also uses the term “dovetailing” to express the positive aspects of 
coordination, as when he says: “Co-ordination does not refer to the well-being achieved 
through its successful attainment; it refers only to the dovetailing character of the 
activities that make it up” (1992, 185; see also 191; 2000, 183, 196). He even says that 
“dovetailing” is the “earmark” of coordination (2000, 190). Later we discuss Kirzner’s 
usage of the term “dovetailing.” 
 
“Coordination makes no resort to social aggregation” 
Kirzner insists that the coordination criterion “relies not at all on any notions 
inconsistent with subjectivism or with methodological individualism” (1992, 185); “The 
coordination criterion does not purport to say anything whatever about aggregate well-
being” (2000, 144); “It is possible to evaluate a system of social organization’s success in 
promoting the coordination of the decisions of its individual members without invoking 
any notion of social welfare at all” (1973, 216).
5 
 
Diagram of Three Rubrics 
In Kirzner, there is a two-step process at work, by which Kirzner asserts that 
Hayek (and Mises) really meant what Kirzner means by “coordination.” Let us explain 
with reference to Figure 2: 
                                                 
5 Hayek at times invokes aggregation quite readily, for example: “the ordering and productivity enhancing 
function of prices, and particularly the prices of services, depends on their informing people where they 
will find their most effective place in the overall pattern of activities—the place in which they are likely to 
make the greatest contribution to aggregate output” (1978c, 63). 
   17 
Figure 2:  
Kirzner has projected III onto Hayek  
by attributing II to Hayek and equating II and III.  
 
I 
Concatenate 
Coordination 
II 
A notion of 
fulfillment or 
compatibility 
III 
A notion of 
opportunity-
exploitation 
HAYEK’S (and 
Mises’s) statements 
about coordination.  
 
 
Kirzner holds that 
coordinative actions 
necessarily entail the 
resolving of problems 
in fulfillment or 
compatibility of plans 
or expectations (or 
the correction of 
error). 
Kirzner holds that 
every entrepreneurial 
gain is coordinative. 
 
 
•  Rubric I: Here is concatenate coordination, and here is where Mises and Hayek 
properly belong. When they spoke of coordination, they almost always meant 
concatenate coordination. As shown in the Excel file, the occurrences of 
coordination are few in Mises and abundant in Hayek. The meaning is clearly 
concatenate. Note that “coordination” did not play a significant role in Mises’s 
propounding of praxeology, so, while we reject that propounding, we see no 
particular problem in Mises’s usage of coordination.
6  
 
•  Rubric II: Here is a Kirznerian coordination wherein expectations/plans are 
fulfilled, compatible, or affirmed. We noted earlier that there is actually quite a lot 
floating around in Kirzner’s utterances about fulfillment, compatibility, and 
affirmation, or—to take them in their negations—disappointment, incompatibility, 
and regret. The variations here have to do with the distinction between what 
happens along a path of action (or plan) and how one regards the entire path in 
                                                 
6 Kirzner (2001) writes: “Now Mises himself never did focus explicitly on plan-coordination in all of his 
work; he never did focus on the dispersed character of knowledge, and on the consequent coordination 
problem. (This does not mean that Mises’s seminal insights in each of the above two areas cannot be 
faithfully articulated in plan-coordination terms; it merely means that Mises himself never explicitly 
recognized this possible articulation.)” (198).   18 
retrospect. The variations here give rise to different versions of the claims under 
rubric II, and we shall see that the versions have differing implications. 
 
•  Rubric III: Here is a Kirznerian coordination wherein every entrepreneurial 
discovery is coordinative. 
  
Kirzner projects III backwards onto Hayek (and Mises), first, by attributing II to 
Hayek’s meaning of coordination, and, second, by equating II and III. We feel that both 
steps are unacceptable. 
Kirzner’s Invocation of Hayek 
Hayek wrote a few passages about expectations or plans being fulfilled, realized, 
or mutually compatible. In every such instance, however, he was speaking of either 
equilibrium or order, not coordination.  In 1937, Hayek wrote: “For a society, then, we 
can speak of a state of equilibrium at a point of time—but it means only that the different 
plans which the individuals composing it have made for action in time are mutually 
compatible” (Hayek 1948 [1937], 41). Perhaps one may read Nash equilibrium into 
Hayek’s idea of equilibrium. Hayek later (1978c, 184) says he prefers the term “order” to 
“equilibrium,” and in trying to clarify “order” he writes of plans being realized or 
expectations being correct (1973, 36, 44-55, 103, 106f).
7 The important thing about these 
passages is that “coordination” is nowhere to be found. Hayek never equates equilibrium 
and coordination and never defines or characterizes coordination in terms of 
plan/expectation fulfillment, or compatibility.  
                                                 
7 In Hayek’s order, plans “can be mostly realized” (1978c, 184; italics added) and that expectations “have a 
good chance of proving correct” (1973, 36; italics added), showing philosophical departure from the 
categorical approach of Mises.   19 
Indeed, in “Economics and Knowledge” (1937), Hayek first writes of equilibrium 
and then emphasizes that such a position of equilibrium “is not an equilibrium in the 
special sense in which equilibrium is regarded as a sort of social optimum” (53)—this 
special sense being coordination, though he does not use the word. Thereafter in the 
article, Hayek talks in a way highly reminiscent of his 1933 lecture. He speaks of a 
“social mind” (54) that sees opportunities unknown to actors in the position of 
equilibrium. In no way does Hayek affirm usage of the term “equilibrium” for the “social 
mind” concept. Hayek’s primary point is that “equilibrium analysis can really tell us 
nothing about the significance of such changes in knowledge” (55). Thus, Hayek’s point 
is that important coordination claims cannot be derived solely from “the pure logic of 
choice.” Decades later, Hayek (1983) said he wrote the piece “to persuade my great 
friend and master, Ludwig von Mises, why I couldn’t accept all of his teachings.” 
It is clear that Hayek used coordination with a connotation of economic goodness. 
Kirzner concedes that “at least sometimes” Hayek used coordination to mean “some 
desired overall patterned outcome” (2000, 189). Referring to Klein (1997a),
 8 Kirzner 
concedes (199) that such usage in Hayek conforms to Klein’s idea of concatenate 
coordination, and Kirzner himself provides several excellent Hayek quotations in which 
coordination means concatenate coordination. Kirzner concedes that these occurrences of 
coordination do not coincide with his own notion of coordination: “such coordination is 
certainly not defined in terms of the mutual compatibility of independently made plans or 
independently held expectations” (189).  
                                                 
8 Kirzner refers to Klein (1997a), where concatenate coordination was originally and regrettably dubbed by 
Klein as “metacoordination.” That regrettable term also appears in Klein (1998).    20 
Kirzner then insists “that, at least part of the time, Hayek was using the term 
‘coordination’ not in the sense of Klein's [concatenate] coordination, but in the sense of 
the achievement of mutual compatibility among independently-made individual plans 
(without regard to any overall desirability of this outcome)” (2000, 199; original 
emphasis). But the evidence is thin. At the top of page 191, Kirzner quotes two essays by 
Hayek, but the quotations by no means clearly involve Kirzner’s notion that coordination 
hinges on plan/expectation fulfillment or compatibility. In one quoted passage, Hayek 
says that in a decentralized system “some method must be found for coordinating these 
separate plans which does not depend on conscious central control” (Hayek [1941] 1997, 
144). The grand concatenation of course entails individuals’ plans, and of course a good 
concatenation must entail good coordination of such plans. The other quotation has 
Hayek speaking of a decentralized system “with prices conveying to each the information 
which helps him to bring his actions in relation to others” (Hayek [1939], 1997, 194). The 
phrase is brief and “in relation to others” is vague, but it is appropriate to read the “helps 
him” in the following allegorical invisible-hand sort of way: Free prices conduce to 
individual actions corresponding in a rough way to those individuals would take if they 
were cooperating in the commonly valued project of making a good overall 
concatenation. Thus, the “helps him” is allegorical—prices help individuals do their part 
in the imagined cooperation. Hayek is contrasting the effectiveness of the decentralized 
approach to that of central direction which, in the very next sentence, is said to entail the 
construct of “some individual mind.” Hayek is yet again grappling with the problem of 
his 1933 lecture, where he affirmed the need to speak of some such “sense” of the social   21 
“organism” even in argumentation against central control.
9 The passages that Kirzner 
invokes are but further instances of Hayek speaking of concatenate coordination.  
Similar interpretation should be applied to the single occurrence of the term 
dovetail in Hayek’s Individualism and Economic Order. We enter into consideration of 
“dovetail” because Kirzner and his followers have used this somewhat mysterious term to 
signify the distinctive Kirznerian notion that coordination hinges on plan 
fulfillment/compatibility. As noted, Kirzner (2000, 190) says that “the dovetailing of 
individual purposive efforts” is the “earmark” of such coordination. Let us examine 
Hayek’s employment of “dovetail,” which occurs in the essay “The Use of Knowledge in 
Society” as the essay appears in Individualism and Economic Order:
10 
Which of these systems is likely to be more efficient depends mainly on the 
question under which of them we can expect that fuller use will be made of the 
existing knowledge. This, in turn, depends on whether we are more likely to 
succeed in putting at the disposal of a single central authority all the knowledge 
which ought to be used but which is initially dispersed among many different 
individuals, or in conveying to the individuals such additional knowledge as they 
need in order to enable them to dovetail their plans with those of others. (Hayek 
1948, 79; italics added) 
 
Once again, we see Hayek’s main concern as concatenate coordination, and we would 
interpret “enable them to dovetail their plans with those of others” as describing the 
allegorical need to guide individual efforts in ways that improve the concatenation. 
                                                 
9 Further, note that talk of prices “conveying” or “communicating” information—as Hayek famously writes 
elsewhere—also is metaphorical or allegorical. Literally speaking, the only information communicated by a 
price is how much money it will take to get the seller to sell. There is no literal communication about 
relative scarcities, profit opportunities, and the like. But again, in the allegory implicit in Hayek, the 
communication of such things would correspond in a rough way to the inducements arising from prices. 
10 We notice that as originally published in the American Economic Review in 1945, Hayek had “fit” in lieu 
of “dovetail.”   22 
Hayek is considering which system is “more efficient,” and of how “fuller use” may be 
made of knowledge. A dove's tail serves as metaphor for concatenate coordination: 
Feathers intermesh so as to produce the curves of the tail; it consists of minute individual 
protrusions, and, like other spontaneous orders in nature such as crystals and snowflakes, 
is beautiful or pleasing to a mind imagined to behold it. The individual feathers do not 
have plans and hence do not experience plan fulfillment. At the same time, we recognize 
that “dovetail” does carry a connotation that, in their situations, individuals experience a 
kind of plan fulfillment and mutual (or Schelling) coordination with their partners. But 
that connotation does not detract from the larger concatenate-coordination interpretation, 
for one core value of the moral community of which Hayek is participating in is that 
individuals should normally experience a sense of purpose, fulfillment, and local 
cooperation (or mutual coordination) in their lives.  
Kirzner (2000, 191) next tries to show that Hayek is Kirznerian by providing two 
quotations in which Hayek writes of plan/expectation fulfillment or compatibility, but in 
those passages Hayek is speaking of equilibrium, not coordination. In fact, the two papers 
that Kirzner quotes, namely Hayek 1937 and 1939, contain no occurrence of the term 
coordination or its cognates.
11 
The only proper location of Hayek in Figure 2 is under rubric I, concatenate 
coordination. Kirzner locates him “at least part of the time” under rubric II. Then, in 
                                                 
11 Similarly, elsewhere Kirzner (2000, 79) writes of how Austrian economics “has dismissed the idea that 
the function of the market is to allocate resources efficiently” and instead embraces the idea that the 
function of the market is “one of coordinating the plans” of participants, and then says how this 
coordinative function “has been interpreted as that of promoting” discovery, and cites, aside from his own 
work, Hayek’s “Competition as a Discovery Procedure” (1978c). The term coordination, however, does not 
occur in Hayek’s piece.    23 
equating II and III, Kirzner implies that Hayek is therefore with him under rubric III. 
Now we turn to the problems of equating II and III. 
 
The Disparities between Kirzner’s Two Pieces 
 
As we have seen, Kirzner makes strong claims about coordination in relation to 
plan fulfillment/compatibility and in relation to the discovery of opportunities. These are 
represented in Figure 2 as rubrics II and III. To maintain his categorical system, these two 
pieces must fit neatly together. Here we argue that those two pieces do not fit neatly 
together. Our own understanding leaves open the distinct possibility that weakened 
versions of the claims may be vitally important, as elaborations on concatenate 
coordination, but we think that the categorical versions should be jettisoned.  
 
Entrepreneurial Discovery Need Not Entail Any Experience of Correction  
(or, III does not imply an error version of II) 
 
Kirzner (1985) writes: “To act entrepreneurially is to identify situations 
overlooked until now because of error” (52),
12 and Kirzner holds that error necessarily 
entails disappointment and/or regret: “The entrepreneurial-competitive process becomes 
visible…as discovering and correcting discordant individual plans and decisions” (1973, 
218). Our objection can be couched within an example offered by Kirzner (1979, 161). 
Robinson Crusoe stands on shore catching fish day after day. One day he realizes that he 
could better catch fish by making a boat. Kirzner writes: “Nothing has changed since 
yesterday except that Crusoe has discovered that his time is more valuably spent in 
building the boat than in catching fish. He has discovered that he had placed an 
                                                 
12 Similarly: “The opportunities that market entrepreneurs perceive and exploit are created by earlier 
coordination failures by market participants” (Kirzner 1992b, 91).   24 
incorrectly low value on his time. His reallocation of his labor time from fishing to boat-
building is an entrepreneurial decision, and, assuming his decision to be a correct one, 
yields pure profit in the form of the additional value discovered to be forthcoming from 
the labor time applied.” In this story, does Crusoe necessarily experience feelings of 
disappointment or regret? In our view, it is possible that he would experience regret in 
not having come to the boat-method sooner. Kirzner says that Crusoe “has discovered 
that he had placed an incorrectly low value on his time.” That telling suggests regret; it 
suggests that Crusoe feels that he had erred in not previously seeing the boat-method 
opportunity. But with a slight change in the story we may have Crusoe entrepreneurially 
discovering the boat-method opportunity without any such feeling of regret—indeed, the 
term “entrepreneurship” would seem to suggest an insight that was not obvious. At any 
rate, it is perfectly natural to have Crusoe one day seeing the boat-method without his 
experiencing any sense of previous error, without any feeling of regret or disappointment 
for his preceding actions. Indeed, if Kirzner maintains that every entrepreneurial 
discovery implies preceding error and hence disappointment and/or regret, then humanity 
must be a lugubrious lot, for they often look back on their preceding actions with a better 
interpretation of the information they had had. By making his claims categorical, Kirzner 
boxes himself into identifying error (and hence disappointment and/or regret) in any 
previous action that one would revise based on one’s later interpretation of the 
information. But such talk will often simply do violence to our language. One day a light 
bulb—illuminating how he may fashion a boat—goes off in Crusoe’s head. This 
entrepreneurial moment is, quite plausibly, one of gleeful pride. Crusoe does not look 
back on yesterday with any sense of disappointment or regret; rather, today he feels a   25 
sense of improvement and forwardness. Entrepreneurship does not necessarily entail 
preceding error or any sense of disappointment or regret. As for the coordinative aspect 
of the story, it is natural enough to say that Crusoe’s discovery is coordinative, for a mind 
imagined to behold the potentialities would smile on Crusoe’s advancement. That mind 
would see a better concatenation of resources and efforts in Crusoe’s world. The story is 
one of coordinative entrepreneurial discovery, but Kirzner’s strict coordination claim 
involving error, disappointment, or regret must be dropped.  
It is straightforward to take the point beyond Crusoe to the normal economy. 
Entrepreneurial actions in the economy simply need not entail any disappointment or 
regret about preceding actions. A story of entrepreneurial discovery is Somerset 
Maugham’s verger who, unable to satisfy his urge for a smoke, is struck by the notion of 
opening a tobacco shop in the lacking area. In Maugham’s story, the verger never feels 
disappointment or regret in not having come to the idea earlier, nor does anyone else. 
There is no reason to insist, as does Kirzner , that there was any prior error. If in 
Kirzner’s system entrepreneurial discovery necessarily entails “correcting discordant 
individual plans and decisions” (1973, 218), then there is something very wrong with the 
system. If prior to the verger’s discovery some being had a feeling of discord, that being 
could only be an imaginary one who beholds the potentialities—and Kirzner says that is 
not what he means.  
 
Entrepreneurial Discovery Often Upsets Other People’s Plans  
(or, III does not imply a fulfillment version of II) 
 
By all intuitive accounts, entrepreneurial discovery often upsets people’s plans. 
Entrepreneurs often surprise established businesses, upset customs, and frustrate some   26 
customers. Had the entrepreneurial discovery not occurred, those customs and businesses 
would have gone forward as planned—actual expectations would have been fulfilled.  
Kirzner notes (2000, 142, 250) that he has received this objection many times. 
Kirzner deals with the objection by saying that the plans and expectations held by the 
other businesses and their customers were erroneous all along, that they did not correctly 
take into account the realities of the situation. It will be useful to scrutinize Kirzner’s 
discourse on this matter. 
In a subsection called "Entrepreneurial Innovation--Coordinative or Disruptive?" 
(2000, 249-252), Kirzner takes up the challenge: 
To see why and how I believe it is possible and accurate to insist on my use of the 
term ‘coordinative’ to describe the entrepreneur’s behavior, it will be useful to 
focus on an example of bold, creative, innovative Schumpeterian entrepreneurship 
responsible for a dramatic technological breakthrough, revolutionizing an entire 
industry. (250) 
 
Notice that Kirzner promises an example of “the entrepreneur’s behavior” – in the 
singular—but in the ensuing pages we never find such an example. The next sentence 
reads: “Consider the invention and innovation of the automobile in the U.S.” He 
elaborates on the example, but henceforth, at least four times, it is now “entrepreneurs”—
plural—who wrought the changes. Rather than the unique action of one individual, 
several entrepreneurs have come up with the same discovery and are simultaneously 
carrying it out or are poised to carry it out. In this story, no single entrepreneur really 
upsets the plans of the buggy-makers, because if entrepreneur A fails to make the 
discovery the buggy-makers’ plans will be devastated just as thoroughly and just as 
swiftly by B, C, D, and E. Thus Kirzner writes: “The truth, as we now know, is that it   27 
was an industry sitting on a powder keg waiting to explode” (251). Thus, Kirzner has 
shifted from “the entrepreneur” to an example that does not face up to the challenge. 
Suppose there is one pioneering entrepreneur without like in sight. If we compare the 
world with and without that entrepreneur’s discovery, we see that without his discovery 
some buggy makers will go on better, their plans will be fulfilled, at least for a longer 
stretch. Dealing with the buggy-maker disappointment and incompatibility that does 
result from the entrepreneurial discovery, then, must lead Kirzner into issues of 
aggregation. 
Another notable instance of Kirzner attempting to address the same challenge is at 
Kirzner (2000, 142f), where he answers Klein (1997a). Again, we fail to see Kirzner 
zeroing in on the comparison of worlds with and without a particular entrepreneurial 
discovery. Again, human experience—verstehen— is not to be credited: “The apparent 
earlier calm which, as a result of the aggressive new competition, has been followed by 
sudden disruption, was in fact utterly misleading. That calm was a façade . . .” (143). In 
sketching the example, Kirzner does not make explicit an assumption about multiple 
simultaneous entrepreneurs; instead, this example carries an implicit assumption that the 
incumbents who foolishly thought they were experiencing calm actually themselves had 
access to the opportunities in question, and could have taken them into account. Under 
that assumption, Kirzner is interpreting his claims under rubric II strictly in the “takes 
into account” version, and not at all in the fulfillment/compatibility version—the 
distinction again based on how things go along a chosen plan and retrospection regarding 
the chosen path. Thus we find shifting from one version of II to another so as to sustain 
the various pieces, as though the versions of II all cohere as one. At any rate, one should   28 
once again insist: If we stick to the original simple example, in which the opportunity 
exists for only a single potential entrepreneur, then we must see that some disappointment 
or upset comes only in the entrepreneurial event. In judging it to be coordinative 
nonetheless, Kirzner must be engaging in some kind of aggregation—which he denies—
or not really invoking rubric II in any fundamental way at all.  
 
Fulfillment and Compatibility Need Not Imply No Further Profit Opportunities  
(or, a fulfillment version of II does not imply III) 
 
Here we deal with the fulfillment/compatibility version of the claims under rubric 
II. We contend that the fulfillment and compatibility of plans and expectations do not 
imply that there are no betterment opportunities out there. A network of people may carry 
on spontaneously, each making plans and forming expectations about the doings of the 
others, and they may find their plans and expectations to be fulfilled and mutually 
compatible in every reasonable and intuitive sense, and yet they may be overlooking 
opportunities for both individual and social betterment. There may be an opportunity for 
a better mousetrap out there, but the overlooking of that opportunity by everyone does 
not necessarily involve any upset to the fulfillment and compatibility of their plans or 
expectations. When the discovery occurs, people might make their future plans 
accordingly, but there is no necessary implication that their plans up to or at such time go 
unfulfilled or encounter incompatibilities. 
Presumably, that is why, within this rubric, Kirzner at times couches the condition 
in terms of taking things into account, as when he characterizes coordination as entailing 
that one “correctly takes into account” how things would go for oneself “were one’s own 
actions to be different” (2000, 136). If one had, instead, built that better mousetrap (and   29 
by implication, we are to suppose, in the first instance discovered the opportunity), then 
things would have gone better for him. So Kirzner’s “takes into account” can do the work 
necessary to get II to imply III, but fulfillment and mutual compatibility, by themselves, 
do not deliver that result. 
We now replay the point in the contrapositive—that is, we examine the 
Kirznerian notion that not-III implies not-II: Does the non-existence of a betterment 
opportunity imply that people do not feel disappointment, discord, or regret? Here we 
must make use of our earlier distinction between how things go along a chosen path and 
retrospection regarding the chosen path. The non-existence of a betterment opportunity 
does imply that people do not feel retrospective regret about the chosen path (assuming of 
course that they do not come to new spurious notions about what opportunities had 
existed). As we understand the terms, regret goes with error, and the non-existence of a 
betterment opportunity implies no error. However, the non-existence of a betterment 
opportunity does not imply that people do not feel disappointment or discord. That is, 
things might not go as hoped or expected, even though there was no particularly better 
way to go about things. It was only the sentiments and expectations that were faulty, not 
the decisions or actions.  
We believe that, all within rubric II, Kirzner has mixed together the two different 
sets of sentiments about a plan: fulfillment vs. retrospective affirmation. Hayek’s words 
about equilibrium and order—which Kirzner treats as words about coordination—involve 
fulfillment and compatibility (or, in the negation, disappointment and incompatibility). 
As Kirzner wishes to claim Hayek as his own, Kirzner uses fulfillment and compatibility, 
but Kirzner seems to sense that what really does go with his discovery ideas (rubric III)   30 
is, rather, “taking into account” (or, in the negation, regret). It is only that version of II 
that implies III.
13 
Problems in Seeing Kirzner’s Two Ideas as Characterizations of 
Coordination 
The previous section considered the Kirznerian ideas of II and III in Table 1. That 
consideration was primarily immanent criticism of the purported cohesion between those 
pieces, not criticism of those ideas as necessary characterizations of coordination. Now 
we focus on the characterizations of coordination in those terms. 
 
Problems in Fulfillment etc. as Characterization of Coordination 
 
 
Kirzner (1992, 141-43) develops a traffic signaling system example to explicate 
coordination. The example proceeds from the point of view of the traffic engineer, not 
any of the motorists. Kirzner speaks without reservation of programming the system “to 
control the flow of traffic in some optimal manner” (141), to avoid collisions and delays. 
The purpose to which Kirzner puts the example is to distinguish between the coordination 
achieved by a static signal program and that achieved by an adaptive signal program that 
changes based on the history of traffic patterns. This is all well and good—Kirzner at his 
best. We say that in both aspects the coordination of which Kirzner speaks is naturally 
interpreted as concatenate coordination.  
                                                 
13 To carry through on the scheme here, we note that III does not imply that (or any other version) of II. 
That is, as we have already argued, entrepreneurial discovery does not imply disappointment, 
incompatibility, or regret. The reason we have the relation (that is, the relation between the “takes into 
account” version of II and III) as only one-way is that we have narrower conceptions of what constitutes an 
entrepreneurial discovery and what constitutes an error, with the narrowness being a matter of how obvious 
the opportunity is (or was)—with obviousness understood within and depending upon the context of the 
discourse. Following Klein (1999), entrepreneurial discovery is only discovery of non-obvious 
opportunities, and error is only the non-discovery of obvious opportunities. Thus, entrepreneurial 
discoveries do not imply previous errors.   31 
Now, suppose the signal program was quite bad—by standards relevant to those 
likely to be talking in a concerned way about such things. Following Kirzner: 
“Southbound drivers find themselves waiting at red lights, let us say at 3:00 in the 
afternoon, for several minutes during which no traffic flows at all in the east-west 
directions. Clearly this waiting is unnecessary; it means that north-south drivers are 
compelled to act in a fashion that is not co-ordinated with the decisions of the east-west 
drivers” (141-42). Our point is this: Where, in this sorry concatenation, is there any 
necessary disappointment, incompatibility, or regret in plans or expectations? Suppose 
that motorists are familiar with the system. They get into their cars expecting a dreary 
journey with long delays; their plans and expectations are fulfilled. Moreover, they have 
no opportunity to improve their situation. There is no sense of regret, nor any feeling of 
discord or incompatibility with the plans of other motorists. 
In this example—which both Kirzner and we readily identify as discoordination—
if there is any sense of disappointment, incompatibility, or regret, it must be on the part of 
the traffic control chiefs. But there again there is no guarantee that such persons actually 
feel any disappointment, incompatibility, or regret. We would hope they care enough 
about motorists’ delays that they come to such sentiments, and we would hope that 
reform of the system is viable, but, even if not, we may still describe the situation as poor 
coordination. It is natural to us to think about the satisfaction that a benevolent mind 
would feel in the achieving of a better signaling system. As for our description of the 
concatenation as a “sorry” one, we may say that if the benevolent being in fact guided the 
traffic officials so as to produce the observed system, that being would feel regret over   32 
the guidance it issued, a regret that derives in some aggregate manner from its sympathies 
with the motorists. 
The previous examples of Crusoe and of the verger do not necessarily imply any 
disappointment, incompatibility, or regret. Likewise, people might experience 
disappointment and discord without there being any discoordination in decisions and 
actions.  
The Kirznerian rubric II involves sentiments and expectations. In our view, the 
only part to be retained in a significant way is to associate regret or self-reproach with 
error
14—an association that Kirzner strongly affirm sometimes (Kirzner 1979, 128-130, 
146, 147; 1985, 56; 1994, 224-25). As for the other sentimental and expectational aspects 
of Kirzner’s discourse about coordination—the positive notions of fulfillment and 
compatibility, the negative notions of disappointment, incompatibility, and discord—we 
see them as only very loosely related to coordination. The problem is that our actions 
involve hopes, visions, and vague awareness of possible contingencies. Often, our doings 
are better described as “muddling through.” There is often ambiguity about whether “our 
plans” go as expected.  They rarely go as well as we wish, and they almost never go in a 
way that is utterly surprising, and how we describe the experience might depend on the 
discourse situation. Further, suppose that people learn to expect little. Does fulfillment or 
disappointment depend on the dispositions or personalities of the individuals involved? 
                                                 
14 In the matter of associating regret/self-reproach with agent error, we would allow the element of regret to 
be merely potential or vicarious. In the matter of associating regret/self-reproach with social error, we 
project the semantics of agent error onto beings that might only be fictitious, metaphorical, or allegorical.   33 
While we accept discovery as highly consonant with concatenate coordination, we do not 
have the same view of fulfillment and compatibility.
15  
 
Problems in Claiming that Every Entrepreneurial Action is Coordinative 
 
“All Swans Are White” 
One can make a system in which all swans are white by defining certain non-
white birds as non-swans. In managing the “field of force” of our scholarly discourse 
(Quine 1961), we jointly manage the strength of claims (the minimal percentage of swans 
that are white) and the semantic distinctions so as to achieve reasonable consistency. But 
consistency is not our only objective. Not all consistent systems are equally good. We 
have to consider the value or usefulness of an entire field, one against another (Quine 
1961). If you make your claims 100%, you have a much more complicated—and possibly 
eccentric—set of distinctions. You might have to attend to definitional “redistricting” in 
myriad minute instances to protect your 100%. Consider the opposite extreme. Suppose 
you work with 0% statements—“Swans are white zero or more percent of the time,” 
“Swans have feathers zero or more percent of the time,” and so forth. Then, for 
consistency, you don’t have to worry about your distinctions at all; even bananas may be 
counted as swans. But 0% claims aren’t serviceable. In managing this Quinean problem, 
we adjust at both ends, finding percentages for our claims in light of the practicality and 
meaningfulness of the semantic options. Like Mises and Rothbard, Kirzner holds an 
image of science that make him enamored of 100% claims. As a concomitant, we 
                                                 
15 Perhaps these terms have gotten into the swirl because of the extensive Austrian discourse involving 
equilibrium and its cognates. Austrians have a practice of speaking of “equilibrium” etc. without reference 
to a model. To our mind, “equilibrium” and its cognates are tropes that only have meaning within certain 
genres of metaphor or storytelling involving a model. The speaker chooses model metaphors to serve the 
purposes of the discourse. Whether some particular phenomena are to be described as equilibrium or 
disequilibrium depends on the model employed.    34 
contend, he ends up making impractical distinctions. Adam Smith was much more 
attuned to the Quinean problem, much less enamored of 100%—even  suspicious of it—
and more respectful of semantics “plain and intelligible to common understandings” 
(Smith 1776, 687). 
Kirzner says that 100% of successful entrepreneurial actions are coordinative. We 
say it is less than 100% but high enough to give the claim presumptive truth. It seems to 
us that many kinds of counter-examples can be creditably presented. There are surely 
cases in which a first mover into a market space happens to be below-average, and that 
things would have gone better if the first mover had not moved into the space and 
gummed it up. This first-mover problem crops up with regard to product lines, 
conventions, standards, internal procedures, relationships, etc. Many other kinds of 
examples might be given in which entrepreneurial gain is discoordinative, including 
monopolistic situations, speculative situations, misleading advertising, exploitation of 
ignorance (e.g., tourist traps), shirking and laziness, opportunism, exploitation of a 
commons, business that are obnoxious or distasteful to some of the local community, and 
demerit markets. Ricketts (1992, 77-78) offers the example of a putative entrepreneur 
getting his acquaintances drunk and talking them into a deal that they’ll later regret. He 
also speaks (p. 82) of interloping entrepreneurs undoing beneficial long-term practices. 
All of these can be voluntary, profitable, and frowned on by the moral community 
involved in our coordination talk. While the proper presumption is that voluntary 
successful entrepreneurship is coordinative, there is no basis for insisting that it always   35 
is.
16 When Kirzner attempts to deal with some of these challenges, he leaves us 
unsatisfied. 
 
Was The Communist Manifesto Coordinative? 
In a moment of entrepreneurship, a man discovers an opportunity to write a 
certain book, get it published, and sell many copies. He enlists a collaborator and 
voluntarily agrees with publishers to produce the book, who voluntarily sell it to 
“sovereign” consumers. The book is very popular. Gains are made by the entrepreneur 
and his associates. Their plans and expectations are fulfilled. They have no regrets.  
The author is Karl Marx and the book is The Communist Manifesto.  On Kirzner’s 
view, it seems, one would have to say that the entrepreneurial act was coordinative. It 
would seem to satisfy all of his diverse aspects of coordination. In our view, however, it 
is reasonable for those who regard The Communist Manifesto as pernicious to judge this 
entrepreneurial act discoordinative. To a liberal humane mind imagine to behold the vast 
concatenation and its potentialities, the creation of The Communist Manifesto is a sad and 
lamentable day. Even if we set aside the pernicious effects the book would have on 
coercive policymaking, the cultural effects were unfortunate.  
Kirzner would, no doubt, say that Marx’s writings are filled with errors. But on 
Kirzner’s view one would have a hard time interpreting the acts involved as error in his 
economic sense. Marx gained, his associates gained, the activity was voluntary, and 
nothing was regretted. To our way of thinking, Marx’s errors were not agent errors, but 
were errors only in the allegorical sense exposited earlier when discussing the traffic 
                                                 
16 George Selgin (1983, 39) distinguished between ‘equilibrating” and “coordinating” and challenged 
Kirzner on the claim that entrepreneurial action is necessarily coordinating. At one point (p. 39) Selgin 
associates coordination with “increased well-being.”   36 
signal system: If the imaginary benevolent being in fact guided Marx and Engels so as to 
have them produce The Communist Manifesto, that being would feel regret over the 
guidance it issued. Even though there is no agent error, there can be error in terms of the 
“sense” of the social “organism” of which Hayek (1933) spoke. Voluntary, successful 
entrepreneurial developments are sometimes discoordinative.  
The Communist Manifesto is merely an extreme example of something that 
frequently occurs in cultural markets—the prosperity of unfortunate, discoordinative 
ideas, forms, beliefs, and sentiments. Even if we presuppose that coercion plays no role – 
that is, we assume that the cultural markets are perfectly free, and that there is no hazard 
of the cultural wares inciting coercive actions – it still makes sense to suppose that 
sometimes discoordinative activities will prosper. We may have good reason to believe 
that the very discoordinativeness of activities in such a setting gives rise to forces that 
tend to make the activities in question unprofitable, but there is no reason to suppose that 
such an invisible hand works instantaneously, which means that along the way it is likely 
that many agents will reap entrepreneurial gains from discoordinative actions. 
 “Markets” vs. “Institutions” 
How would Kirzner deal with such contentions about cultural products? A clue 
might be found in his discussion of path-dependence. Kirzner (1992, 166-179) confronts 
the possibility of inferior patterns, standards, and practices getting locked in. Kirzner 
even uses “inferior” and “superior” to describe them. He gives the example of using feet 
and inches, and notes that “a superior system of measurement might have emerged” 
(172). He gives the example of “some hardy soul” (175) starting a path in a deep snow, 
and others following in this footsteps. He suggests that the path might persist through   37 
time as the route people follow even though it is very inferior to other routes that might 
have emerged. Kirzner seems to be acknowledging that, under the circumstances, 
successful entrepreneurial action by certain path-finders can produce inferior results. But 
he safeguards his categorical claims by saying that such cases concern “institutions,” 
whereas his theories are about “markets.” In the paragraph that concludes the essay, 
Kirzner writes:  
… these earlier economic insights into the spontaneously co-ordinative properties 
of markets do not, in themselves, provide any reassurance concerning the benign 
quality of the long-run tendencies of institutional development. … the 
spontaneous co-ordination which occurs in markets provides us with no basis for 
any extension of the welfare theorems relating to markets to the broader field of 
the theory of institutional evolution. (Kirzner 1992, 179) 
 
Kirzner draws a line between “markets” and voluntary “institutions.” But how 
does one draw the line? Will one say that any time there is any element of path-
dependence –in products, in standards, in practices, in customs – the activity becomes 
“institutional” and hence cannot be taken as a challenge to his theory? But don’t practices 
and customs suffuse all market activity? A barber shop, a grocery store, Craigslist.org, 
Amazon.com, etc. are, in every sense of the term, institutions. The expressions and 
workings of demand and supply typically proceed within the context of institutions. One 
might wonder whether Kirzner’s “market” represents merely some blackboard example 
devoid of institutional context. Yet, Kirzner goes about his categorical coordination 
claims as though they have common relevance to real-world economic affairs. Where he 
separates “markets” and “institutions” Kirzner (1992, 166-179) offers no clarification of 
the difficulties in making that separation—he does not even acknowledge the difficulties.   38 
Moreover, Kirzner’s “inferior” and “superior” in speaking of “institutions” is 
quite mysterious. In speaking of “institutions,” Kirzner avoids the term coordination, 
apparently because he wishes to reserve the coordination criterion for talk of markets. So 
what is the criterion for institutions? The only clarification is reference to Pareto rankings 
(170, 172). But that is so narrow as to be useless—indeed, shouldn’t we assume that the 
first hardy soul who trudged through the snow did so in a way that was individually 
optimal? Kirzner speaks of “inferior” and “superior” without any indication of the 
criterion involved, or of how it relates to coordination.  
Brian Loasby (1982), Martin Ricketts (1992), and others have brought similar 
criticisms. Kirzner relates Loasby's challenge: “Loasby stresses not only the possibility of 
entrepreneurial mistakes in the face of an uncertain future, but also the possibility that 
entrepreneurs discover profit opportunities through deliberately misleading the consumer 
(Loasby 1982, 121) or through speculatively purchasing assets…” (Kirzner 1992, 13-14).  
Kirzner sets up the challenge quite dramatically, but in the remaining 13 pages of the 
essay he never seems to answer it.  He essentially addresses a different challenge, namely 
that sometimes entrepreneurs err and drive the market in a wrong direction (a matter that 
Loasby also raised). Kirzner writes: “the postulation of a tendency for profit opportunities 
to generate equilibration has not been put forward as an inexorable, determinate 
sequence. The emphasis upon the incentive to win profits has not been intended to deny 
the possibility of entrepreneurial losses” (21). His lengthy examples of the erroneous 
bicycle factor inducing a demand for steel (29-30) and of the shoe producer acting 
through time (32f) are examples of entrepreneurial error, not entrepreneurial success.  He 
says at the end of the shoe-producer example:  “But it is always the case, nonetheless,   39 
that appropriate entrepreneurial incentives do, at any given moment, offer themselves in 
regard to the path relevant to the realities” (31). But the issue is whether entrepreneurial 
incentives not thusly appropriate, too, might ever offer themselves, and Kirzner never 
seems to address the matter. He concludes the essay with many gestures at concession 
and relaxation of his claims (see esp. 34-36), but without confronting the real challenge. 
Similarly, in responding to Ricketts’ point that sometimes profit can be had in ways that 
are indubitably voluntary but manipulative, Kirzner (1992b) dodges it with the 
pronouncement that his work is not intended to apply in contexts “[w]here property rights 
are not well defined, not fully protected, or otherwise not complete enough to satisfy the 
conditions for a fully private enterprise economy” (93). 
 
Does Kirzner Stretch “Entrepreneurship” to Include All Action? 
 
We suggest examples of discoordinative successful voluntary entrepreneurship, 
including:  
•  Misleading marketing practices, manipulation 
•  A low-quality first mover leading to lock-in 
•  Speculative bubble 
•  Establishing an opium den in a community 
•  The Communist Manifesto 
•  Local cultural effects (e.g., a brothel, obnoxious billboards) 
•  Opportunism, shirking, etc. 
 
One way Kirzner might try to deal with some of these examples is to regard all action as 
entrepreneurial and to thereby disqualify some of the examples as cases of omnilateral 
successful entrepreneurship. Suppose a tourist trap sells tourist items at terms which, say, 
we know the consumer is very likely to quickly discover were bad terms. Suppose most   40 
such buyers will presently feel “ripped off.”
17 Kirzner might say that this is not an 
example of successful entrepreneurship because the success is not omnilateral—the 
consumers, too, he might say, are entrepreneurs, and they do not feel the transaction was 
a success. Mises (1963) writes: “In any real and living economy every actor is always an 
entrepreneur” (252) —and Kirzner (1979, 28) quotes the statement approvingly.
18 Thus, 
every consumer who walks into a 7-Eleven and buys a carton of milk instantiates the 
entrepreneur. We think that this indiscriminate use of “entrepreneur” or 
“entrepreneurship” is wrongheaded. Interpretive perception plays some role in all human 
action, but we think that the entrepreneurial aspect corresponds with the non-obviousness 
of the opportunity discovered.
19 Following the accustomed grooves of going to 7-Eleven 
to buy milk usually will not qualify. Rather than seeing a continuum of interpretive 
perceptiveness and demarcating an exceptional category as entrepreneurial—like 
Schumpeter (1934, 81-82), not only for entrepreneurship but for “being able to sing”— 
Kirzner sometimes insists that the “zero” point of interpretive perceptiveness is 
mechanical and that anything greater than zero is entrepreneurship. It is like treating the 
idea of “fatness” as having more than zero fat on one’s body, or saying that thin people 
are “a little fat.” We believe that this is misguided. We believe that Kirzner conflates 
entrepreneurship and interpretive perceptiveness, just as the suggested analogy would 
conflate fatness and body weight. Properly speaking, thin people are not in the “fat” 
                                                 
17 To clarify further, assume that the consumer affirms the level of trust he had put in the merchant’s 
decency. He feels, not that he erred, but that he was “ripped-off,” but not quite defrauded in a sense that 
would make what the merchant had done coercive. 
18 See also Kirzner (1973, 33f) and (2001, 87). 
19 See Klein 1999, 61-62. Klein’s approach would focus more on types of discoveries and discovery factors 
(Klein 1997b), and would relinquish “entrepreneur” more to ordinary language; this relates to the point by 
High (1982, 166) and Ricketts (1992, 72) that Kirzner’s system does not allow a place for entrepreneurial 
losses. The refocusing of Kirzner’s insights on discovery factors, not entrepreneurship, also relates to the 
reservations that Peter G. Klein (2008) and Joseph T. Salerno (2007) have about Kirzner’s characterization 
of entrepreneurship.   41 
category at all, and people who show little or only ordinary interpretive perceptiveness 
are not in the “entrepreneur” category at all.
20 
Indeed, Kirzner seems to be inconsistent in this regard. In keeping with ordinary 
language, Kirzner writes of entrepreneurial discovery as an “unanticipated enjoyment” 
that “lifts one out of the routine sequence of everyday experience” (1992b, 86). In 
general, one naturally reads Kirzner’s entrepreneur talk through the lens of ordinary 
semantics. Kirzner seems to revert to the overly expansive conception only when he 
needs to invoke an idea of omnilateral entrepreneurial success to get out of certain binds. 
If Kirzner wants to hold that “every actor is always an entrepreneur,” where does 
that leave him? First, his statement about the coordinativeness of activities that satisfy 
omnilateral successful entrepreneurship has coverage that is significantly truncated. 
Perhaps Kirzner would say that it simply does not apply to the tourist trap, which he 
might agree is discoordinative, since the consumers, too, are now counted as 
entrepreneurs. Could he likewise exclude the several other examples we offer? Perhaps, 
with enough work, but it seems to us that he will need to get into counterfactuals about 
collective action (e.g., in the path-dependent cases) as well as whether we may say that 
people act in the forming of certain attitudes, sentiments, expectations, and habits, and 
even in adopting certain beliefs: Are we to say that one commits entrepreneurial error in 
                                                 
20 Kirzner’s overly expansive conception of entrepreneurship touches another problem we see in Kirzner. 
We focus on Kirzner’s claim that every entrepreneurial event is coordinative. But Kirzner also asserts the 
converse—that coordinative enhancements come only by entrepreneurial actions. He suggests this when he 
writes: “What alone tends to introduce a modicum of consistency and coordination into this picture, 
preventing a situation in which even the slightest degree of coordination could exist only as a matter of 
sheerest chance, is market entrepreneurship, inspired by the lure [of] pure market profit” (1973, 59; italics 
added; see also 1992, 151). We rejected Kirzner’s claim that coordinative enhancements (save those by 
sheerest chance) come only by entrepreneurial action because we take a narrower view of entrepreneurship. 
To follow through on our analogy in the text, to say that coordinative enhancements come only by 
entrepreneurial actions is like saying that coordinative enhancement come only by actions by fat people. 
   42 
investing intellectual, moral, or spiritual capital in an inferior technological system, The 
Communist Manifesto, a drug habit, or identification with a “clean” neighborhood? Now 
that everyone is an entrepreneur, whatever basis we have for saying that an event is 
discoordinative might be turned by Kirzner into an instance of some entrepreneur not 
having acted successfully. Thus, once we minutely, idiosyncratically snip away all the 
discoordinative cases, we are left with only coordinative cases.  
It appears that Kirzner goes to impractical lengths to preserve certain Misesian 
“pure, universal truths of economic theory” (Kirzner 2001, 56). But, if this is how 
Kirzner would handle the challenging cases, he must admit the truncated coverage of the 
application of those truths. The “pure truths” do not apply universally, except in the sense 
that they apply universally within the hodgepodge of cases in which they apply. This is 
unfortunate. The vital truths that Kirzner teaches would, if rendered in by-and-large 
versions, be more serviceable and more widely applicable. Instead, because of problems 
that comes with 100% conceptualizations, people jettison what is vital and good in 
Kirzner. 
 
Is Kirzner Building Out around an Axiom about Voluntary Interaction? 
 
What would it mean for Kirzner for entrepreneurship to be discoordinative? 
Studying Kirzner’s works carefully, one gets the feeling that “coordinative” is necessarily 
built into successful voluntary entrepreneurship – or, more generally, simply successful 
voluntary action – by Mises’s dictum of human action.  
Murray Rothbard was much more blatant in building out around an axiom about 
voluntary interaction. He propounds a principle of “demonstrated preference,” minimizes 
talk of entrepreneurship and coordination, and states bluntly: “Voluntary exchanges, in   43 
any given period, will increase the utility of everyone and will therefore maximize social 
utility” ([1962], 770); “no government interference with exchanges can ever increase 
social utility” ([1956], 252). Rothbard makes his claim to 100% deduction quite clear: 
“since all government actions rest on its taxing power, we can deduce that: no act of 
government whatever can increase social utility” ([1956], 252).  Similarly, Joseph 
Salerno (1993) writes: “We may thus conclude that every act of intervention 
unambiguously lowers social welfare” (131). Kirzner often seems to be making the same 
kind of 100% claim, but much less explicitly. If so, why not make it explicit? If Kirzner 
is intent on having a system in which voluntary implies coordinative, why not make that 
clear from the outset, and then proceed to show how he proposes to alter the entire field 
of concepts, semantics, and statements so as to achieve that goal? Doing so would have 
the virtue of directness.  
In an essay “The Limits of the Market” (contained in Kirzner 2000), Kirzner 
denies the possibility of faulty market operation; he denies the very idea of market 
failure. But in Kirzner’s scheme, what would it mean for the market to be faulty, for there 
to be market failure? Has he done nothing more than twist coordination talk and its 
domains as needed so as to maintain that successful voluntary action in the market is 
always coordinative? 
 
 
Economic Goodness and Some Larger Goodness 
Even if one accepts Kirzner’s distinction between “markets” and “institutions,” 
and supposes that there remain substantive cases and issues in the “market” category, do   44 
we find Kirzner in that domain taking a firm Rothbardian libertarian line? No, we do not. 
We find out, essentially, that while coordination is the last word in economic goodness, it 
does not necessarily agree with some larger goodness. In Kirzner’s eschewal of the 
Rothbardian line, we encounter another distinction:  
To say that the market process works successfully in the context of externalities is 
certainly not to pronounce the market outcome socially optimal… Nor is it, in and 
of itself, to declare governmental attempts compulsorily to internalize 
externalities, to be a definite error (since, after all, governmental policy may seek 
to reflect citizens’ preferences as these are understood in moral or political terms, 
rather than in the narrow, austerely ‘scientific’ terms within which economic 
science confined). (Kirzner 2000, 82)   
 
Kirzner seems to be saying that his coordination claims pertain only to 
“economic” aspects of preferences, plans, expectations, opportunities, etc., as opposed to 
“moral and political” aspects. In the essay, Kirzner is not dealing with issues like culture 
or political identity but with conventional discussion of economic externalities such as 
pollution. Kirzner seems to be saying that it may be socially bad if gas stations sell leaded 
gasoline and make profits, but the external ill effects do not count in considerations of 
whether selling leaded gasoline is coordinative. Somehow those ill effects are cast out as 
“moral and political.”  
There might be merit in distinguishing “economic goodness” from other kinds of 
goodness—notably some larger goodness that subsumes economic goodness. But Kirzner 
seems to make the distinction simply to maintain his 100% claims while eschewing the 
Rothbardian line about larger goodness. If we are serious about a distinction between 
economic goodness and larger goodness, we should get specific about: (1) what   45 
constitutes the distinction, (2) what, broadly, is the nature of larger goodness, and (3) 
what value the distinction has. Kirzner enters into nothing of the kind. 
 
 
Can the Coordination Standard Be Used to Criticize Interventions? 
 
Kirzner’s works, efforts, and intellectual community are imbued with liberal 
purpose.  The great message is that liberty is far more valuable and worthy than accorded 
by the public culture and public policy. The teachings on coordination are directly and 
deeply related to this great message. Kirzner indicates this deep connection when he 
writes: 
 
We can now understand how Mises came to believe that economic science leads 
us ineluctably to the conclusion that a policy favoring unfettered free markets, a 
policy of laissez-faire, of capitalism without any government intervention, is 
scientifically demonstrated to be the best policy. A free market works in a 
systematic way to encourage coordination among the decisions of market 
participants, with the motivating force being the needs and preferences of 
consumers. (Kirzner 2001, 170) 
 
But, while the liberal character of Austrian discourse is plain, when we get down 
to specifics in Kirzner’s works about the connection between coordination talk and policy 
argumentation, we encounter problems—and we believe that the problems arise from 
Kirzner’s two basic errors: insisting on 100% and not embracing concatenate 
coordination. 
 
Kirzner Seems to Say that We Cannot Use Coordination to Compare Policy 
Regimes   46 
Despite the liberal flavor of Kirzner’s coordination talk, his discourse grows 
abstruse and inconsistent in attempting to show how the coordination talk works in 
comparating coordination of policy regimes. He writes: “The criterion is itself admittedly 
unable to discriminate between the economic goodness of different moral/legal 
frameworks, unless one of them is taken as the relevant starting point” (2000, 139). This 
phrasing (similarly found on 138) would seem to suggest that you can discriminate 
between frameworks but that the judgment will depend on which one you start at. A full 
examination of the texts, however, leaves such a reading in doubt. Another possible 
reading is that Kirzner is saying you simply cannot make judgments of coordination 
across legal frameworks.  
In attempting to elucidate, Kirzner offers the following: 
To see this at the most elementary level, imagine that agent alpha prefers a 
marginal unit of beef over a marginal unit of chicken, while agent beta prefers the 
chicken over the beef. It will make all the difference in the world, in our judgment 
of coordination or miscoordination in regard to the distribution of beef and 
chicken ownership, whether we (i) begin with a situation in which alpha and beta 
‘own’ the chicken and beef respectively, or (ii) begin with a situation in which 
alpha, say, ‘owns’ both the beef and the chicken. From the perspective of situation 
(i), coordination would require that alpha finish up having the beef, and beta 
having the chicken. But from the perspective of situation (ii), it is that initial 
situation (in which alpha owns both the beef and the chicken) which is the 
coordinated situation. From a strictly economic perspective (i.e., from a 
perspective which is neutral in regard to the relative morality or legality of 
alternative initial property rights patterns of distribution) one cannot pronounce 
situation (ii) as economically ‘bad’—even though that situation would be 
perceived as uncoordinated, were our initial vantage point to have been a situation   47 
in which the beef and chicken were, initially, differently distributed. (Kirzner 
2000, 139) 
 
Thus, Kirzner says that if we started with a situation in which alpha and beta each had a 
piece of meat, but ended with beta having both pieces, the outcome is uncoordinated. 
Kirzner implies, in parallel fashion, that if we started with beta owning both and ended 
with each having a piece of meat, it would be uncoordinated. Kirzner does not say how, 
from each starting point, such outcomes emerge. Kirzner’s thrust seems to be that 
whenever there is an alteration in the “moral/legal framework,” then coordination cannot 
be used. The meat example leaves us uncertain, however, since, in the first example, 
where Kirzner pronounces the outcome “uncoordinated” it would seem that beta stole 
alpha’s chicken. If that is what Kirzner means to imply, perhaps he would say that 
individual coercion does not count as an alteration in the moral/legal framework.  
Kirzner attempts to clarify by drawing an analogy between the coordination 
criterion and distance. “The question ‘How far is it to Chicago?’ cannot be answered 
except by reference to some ‘arbitrarily-given’ starting point” (139). True enough, but the 
kind of distance question that would be analogous to the question of comparative 
coordination is: Which is further from Chicago, St. Louis or Indianapolis? But Kirzner’s 
discussions of these matters (principally at 2000, 80f, 138f) seem to suggest that there is 
no comparative coordination across policy regimes. On this reading, we simply cannot 
speak of whether a policy reform would help or hurt coordination: “coordination cannot 
be defined except within a given, adopted moral/legal framework; nonetheless, within 
that framework, it offers an objective criterion” (139). To follow through on the distance   48 
analogy, Kirzner, then, would be saying that we cannot speak of whether St. Louis or 
Indianapolis is farther from Chicago.  
If Kirzner were to stick to this line, surely it would be quite astonishing. Despite 
the pervasive liberal character of all the coordination talk, we would be taking Kirzner to 
be saying that it is useless in comparing regimes. On this view, we cannot say that 
abolishing slavery was coordinative; we cannot say whether the imposition of pre-market 
approval for pharmaceuticals was discoordinative; we cannot say that socializing the food 
industry would be discoordinative. On this view, Kirzner’s coordination criterion would 
say that voluntary entrepreneurial actions within a regime are coordinative, and little else.  
 
But Kirzner Uses Coordination to Compare Policy Regimes 
Although Kirzner seems to say that we cannot use coordination to compare policy 
regimes, he then on the next page (2000, 140) uses it to compare policy regimes. The sole 
policy example addressed there is the issue of central planning versus free markets. Here 
Kirzner is abstruse and it is necessary to quote at length: 
What Mises showed, of course, was that at a deeper level, the central planner 
cannot create a true plan, since he cannot engage in ‘economic calculation,’ i.e., 
each part of the ‘plan’ is necessarily made without full awareness of its true 
implications for other parts of the attempted plan. What this means, in terms of 
our notion of coordination is that the actions called for by the attempted central 
plan are uncoordinated in the sense that, were the various agents in the socialized 
economy to have the freedom to make their own decisions (with full awareness of 
each other’s decisions and potential decisions), (i.e., were they to be assigned 
specific property rights), they would find it mutually beneficial not to follow the 
pattern of actions in fact dictated by the central plan—even if the central planner’s 
objective was that of fulfilling the preferences of agents, to the greatest socially   49 
possible extent. The economic inadequacy of socialist planning is thus to be 
understood as seen from the hypothetical starting point of some (i.e., any) pattern 
of property rights. (Kirzner 2000, 140-41) 
 
The passage seems to be saying the following: If we assume that the central plan was 
intended to fulfill “the preferences of agents, to the greatest socially possible extent,” and 
if instead of the socialist regime there was a pervasive assignment of private property 
rights, then the various agents would have done differently than the erstwhile plan, and 
on that basis “the actions called for by the attempted central plan are uncoordinated.”  
Kirzner deems the central plan “uncoordinated” on the basis that, acting under 
laissez-faire capitalism, “the various agents in the socialized economy … would find it 
mutually beneficial not to follow the pattern of actions in fact dictated by the central 
plan.” Kirzner does not clarify the principle here, but he seems to be saying that any 
policy regime that results in outcomes other than those which would prevail under 
laissez-faire capitalism is uncoordinated. Since any significant departure from laissez-
faire capitalism will result in different outcomes, the only thing that such a principle 
achieves is to render a binary criterion of economic goodness: Laissez-faire private 
enterprise regimes are coordinated, and all the others are uncoordinated. Such a criterion 
of economic goodness would be neither useful nor reasonable. 
At other moments, Kirzner makes judgments about policy in terms of 
coordination very plainly. Consider the following two cases: 
•  “Imposed price ceilings may, similarly, not merely generate discoordination in 
the markets for existing goods and services (as is of course well recognized in 
the theory of price controls); they may inhibit the discovery of wholly new 
opportunities.” (Kirzner 1985, 38-39)     50 
•  “Quite apart from the discoordination generated by such imposed prices in the 
markets for existing goods and services, price (and also quality) restraints also 
may well inhibit the discovery of wholly new opportunities” (Kirzner 1985, 
143). 
 
Here Kirzner casually cites the “well recognized” problems of price controls as 
instantiations of discoordination. Such discoordination would surely be a demerit of such 
regimes, in comparison to regimes without such discoordination.  
Kirzner, despite himself, clearly wants to use coordination to judge policy reform. 
But in a footnote at the conclusion of the primary essay on the matter, he seems to 
acknowledge that things are unsettled: “We must readily grant that even if the arguments 
in this chapter are accepted, we have not yet firmly established the usefulness of the 
coordination concept as the criterion for economic goodness. The serviceability of the 
coordination criterion, as a device with which to rank a series of alternative policies, has 
to be concretely demonstrated” (2000, 147, n 18).  
 
On the Evaluation of Price Controls 
Now think about the lately bulleted statements in which Kirzner says that price 
controls generate discoordination. How would he square that with his own 
characterizations of coordination? The “well recognized” disadvantages of rent control 
involve the deadweight loss from curtailed quantity transacted and the mal-allocation of 
those units that are transacted. In what way do these problems fit Kirzner’s 
characterizations of coordination? Under rubric II, there is no way to see those problems 
as either a lack of fulfillment or compatibility of plans or expectations. People expect   51 
rent-controlled rates, they expect shortages, queues, and so on. Nor is there any regret on 
the part of market participants. As for rubric III, the well recognized discoordination does 
not involve any missing of profit opportunities. The law expunges opportunities that 
would exist in the absence of the law. The standard analysis does not involve any 
unexploited opportunities. Kirzner has no basis in his characterizations for calling the 
well recognized harms of rent-control “discoordination.” 
Indeed, if we were serious about Kirzner’s characterizations of coordination, 
where would that leave the libertarian economist? Quite plausibly, occupational 
licensing, the postal monopoly, and the government school system tend toward a 
regimentation of affairs and bring greater fulfillment of plans and expectations. Plans and 
expectations adapt to any environment, and, thus perhaps there are more moments of 
frustration and regret in a dynamic system than in a regimented one. Take regimentation 
to the extreme and think of life within a prison or military training camp; in Kirzner’s 
terms of rubrics II and III, these would seem to suffer little discoordination. 
The problem is Kirzner’s characterization. Of course those interventions are 
discoordinative, for in the back of our minds is concatenate coordination. To a liberal 
mind imagined to know the set of possible concatenations, each of those interventions is 
undesirable relative to freer arrangements. The interventions are viewed as undesirable 
for a variety of reasons, including matters of discovery, and including standard 
deadweight-loss analyses.  
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Why We Should Own Up to—and Properly Locate—the “Loose, Vague, 
and Indeterminate” 
 
By 1973, the year of Competition and Entrepreneurship, the economics 
profession had for many generations experienced the trend toward formalization. 
Increasingly, human beings were being thought of as optimization machines—a trend 
exquisitely protested by Buchanan (1979) on moral grounds. On knowledge grounds, 
Kirzner illuminated crucial ways in which human beings cannot be reduced to machines. 
The trends against which Kirzner was leaning were part of a broader trend. Modernist 
social scientists felt the need to do value-free science, to establish separate scientific 
disciplines, and to schematize the discipline’s teachings. These developments went hand-
in-hand with the deterioration of any liberal consensus within the moral community—
social democracy and interventionism were ascendant and socialism threatened radical 
change. 
While Kirzner’s sensitivity to knowledge’s richness drew from Hayek, his image 
of economic science followed Mises. In developing his ideas about entrepreneurship and 
coordination, Kirzner attempted to preserve the Misesian praxeological vision of 
wertfreiheit and exact deduction from a priori truths. Kirzner answered one form of 
modernism with another. He worked hard to have a modernist economic science that 
incorporated his key insights, but over time the efforts grew increasingly abstruse.  
In our view, economics is part of the humanities. It is really political economy, of 
a piece with moral and political philosophy. Inquiry, argumentation, and judgment in the 
field is bound to enter into realms of the “loose, vague, and indeterminate,” to use Adam 
Smith’s phrase (1790, 175, 327). Modernism may be seen as the effort to exile the loose,   53 
vague, and indeterminate.
21 The “utility” that agents maximized was utterly vague (Coase 
[1977]),
22 but no matter: the substance of “utility” was safely placed outside the province 
of economic science. All such nebulae were to be eliminated from the science. The 
aspiration was to make the science a sort of grammar, which Smith described as “precise, 
accurate, and indispensable” (1790, 175). But the only way to do this is to skirt the most 
important things—that is, the most important issues, positions, and arguments. Any 
economics that speaks to the most important things is, whether it admits it or not, bound 
to enter into the loose, vague, and indeterminate. Kirzner is devoted to addressing the 
most important things. He ends up with plenty that is loose, vague, and indeterminate. 
His discourse includes ambiguities and inconsistencies such as the following: 
•  Kirzner runs together two perspectives: Plan fulfillment vs. retrospective plan 
affirmation. Similarly, he is inconsistent on whether error entails regret.
23 
 
•  Kirzner says that “every actor is always an entrepreneur” (1979, 28) but also that 
entrepreneurial discovery “lifts one out of the routine sequence of everyday 
experience” (1992b, 86). 
 
•  Kirzner says coordination cannot be used to make judgments across regimes, and 
yet he uses it to make judgments across regimes. 
 
•  Kirzner characterizes coordination with the ideas of both rubric II and rubric III, 
but we have argued that those two rubrics do not go hand-in-hand. 
 
Kirzner also makes dubious or vague distinctions, including: 
 
•  “markets” vs. “institutions” (1992, 166-179) 
                                                 
21 Incidentally, it might be proper to see “modern” as post-Newton, and Adam Smith really as something of 
an exception in the general, centuries-long stream. But modernism becomes especially virulent (and “value 
free”) with the decline of liberalism/rise of social democracy. 
22 “To say that people maximize utility tells us nothing about the purposes for which they engage in 
economic activity and leaves us without any insight into why people do what they do” (Coase [1977], 43); 
“man must recognize that even within his own private sphere of action there is no maximand” (Buchanan 
1979, 110): “Smith would not have thought it sensible to treat man as a rational utility-maximiser” (Coase 
[1976], 116). 
23 Again, Kirzner strongly associates regret/self-reproach with error at 1979, 128-130, 146, 147; 1985, 56; 
1994, 224-25.   54 
•  “economic” vs. “political” preferences (or aspects/dimensions of preferences) 
(2000, 82). 
 
It makes sense that discourse about the most important things would inevitably 
involve the loose, vague, and indeterminate. If the most important things could be 
resolved by grammar-like sciences, then those things would be settled and would no 
longer be most important at the operative margins of discourse. While the aspiration is 
always to get more of a grammar into our understanding of the most important things, it 
is vain to think that we can ever elude the loose, vague, and indeterminate. 
Owning up to the looseness, we then may think about how best to manage and 
locate it in our discourse. Our view is that we ought to be open about the looseness of our 
sensibilities about the desirable, about goodness, and specifically here about the aesthetic 
aspects of coordination. Kirzner, by contrast, claims to have “a clear-cut, objective 
criterion” (2000, 133), with the result that muddleness erupts throughout his teachings.  
Mainstream economists have tried to relieve discomfort with the looseness that 
inheres in their doings by replacing concatenate coordination with “efficiency,” 
“optimality,” and “the social welfare function.” These are served up as precise and 
accurate maximands, but in fact they often become vague and indeterminate when put to 
important social purposes. On our view, economists should resist translating concatenate 
coordination as efficiency or optimality precisely because coordination does not pretend 
to or aspire to a maximand. 
When an economist says, “Rent-control hurts coordination,” the statement 
addresses certain narrow consequences of rent control as well as the concept of 
coordination itself; in making the statement, the economist aims to edify listeners with 
regard to the relevant moral and aesthetic sensibilities. In his book Adam Smith and the   55 
Virtues of Enlightenment, Charles Griswold (1999) writes that Smith’s “work evinces a 
sophisticated awareness of the problem of the relationship between form, content, and 
audience” (41), and that his discourse “is intended to persuade us to view things in a 
certain light, to refine the ways in which we judge and feel, and perhaps to encourage us 
to act in a certain manner” (49). Griswold thusly characterizes Smith’s discourse as 
protreptic—a term that refers back to Greek discourse that endeavored to persuade 
students, whose basic outlook and attitudes are still formative, to come to a favored way 
of viewing the whole matter, both “cause” and “effect” and their relations in one 
encompassing formulation, in preference to competing formulations, attitudes, and 
outlooks. Griswold views the “invisible hand” in just this way: 
Just as the ‘invisible hand of Jupiter” was part of the vocabulary of ancient 
‘superstition,” the ‘invisible hand’ is part of Smith’s philosophical and protreptic 
rhetoric whose purpose is likewise to establish order persuasively. The many 
‘teleological’ or even, on occasion, ‘religious’ statements in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments must be understood in connection with this aestheticized speculative 
outlook. (Griswold 1999, 333) 
 
The economics literature that used “coordination” in discussing the vast 
concatenation had a similar protreptic quality, in that it addressed the aesthetic 
sensibilities that ponder the vast concatenation. The protreptic quality—addressed to 
edification of basic attitudes, aesthetics, and outlooks—did not fit the “value-free” values 
of putatively scientific economics, and hence was discouraged and displaced by more 
formal discourse. In the modernist century, each journal article or textbook chapter 
arranged for itself a neat setting and story, and “efficiency,” “optimality,” and “the social 
welfare function” were represented in those analytic settings. Yet as game theorists from   56 
John von Neumann (Dore et al 1989, xiv) to Robert Aumann (1985, 42) have 
acknowledged, there is an aesthetic lurking behind such genres as well. The problem is 
that model-building aesthetics are typically ill-suited to addressing important social 
purposes. If we are going to make the aesthetic element accountable to important social 
purpose, we ought not to keep it in the dark. 
Kirzner writes:  “What is needed for an objectively-based normative economics, 
is a criterion which, like the criteria which identify a particular disease, can be 
unambiguously identified by economic science and which, again as in the case of disease, 
seems likely to be able to serve as a norm for goodness in the light of independently 
established, widely shared or otherwise assumed moral principles” (2000, 134).  Kirzner 
writes as though “disease” is hammered out by science, and then the business of human 
affairs puts that learning to use. Similarly, he thinks that science hammers out the 
coordination criterion, and then the morally relevant community may adopt the criterion 
as a norm in evaluating policies. But the separation is false and unnatural. If the morally 
relevant public did not perceive beauty to inhere in coordination, what sense would it 
make to use that protreptic term? Suppose the morally relevant public was virulently 
closed and illiberal. What kind of discourse situation would have an economist talking to 
them of coordination (whatever it is, but assuming it is broadly liberal) and calling it 
“coordination”? The auditors might listen and say to the economist, “Ah, thank you, now 
we understand better what we must do to achieve discoordination.” 
In the case of medicine, perhaps it is much easier to separate grammar and 
aesthetics. “Mental illness” aside, a disease is quite distinct from the organism it afflicts. 
It is simple to assume that we are rooting for the organism and against the disease. In   57 
social policy, however, the “disease” is societal practices, interests, and beliefs. It is often 
a matter of individuals being unenlightened, of their beliefs being their affliction. The 
dialectics of discourse drive it toward those disagreements in which interlocutors invoke 
sensibilities that are not so widely shared that we may usefully fashion them “objectively-
based normative economics.” 
Kirzner (2000) writes: “Use of the coordination criterion involves no such moral 
commitment at all, on anybody’s part. Use of the coordination-criterion presumes that 
those advised by the economist are morally concerned that members of society [achieve 
better coordination]” (145). But wouldn’t cooperating with policymakers entail a kind of 
commitment to their moral concerns? If advising the makers of public policy—or using 
the protreptic “coordination” in teaching 19-year olds how to interpret political and 
economic affairs—does not often or even typically entail moral commitments, then what 
does? 
Kirzner elaborates on how Mises presupposes a value of “consumer sovereignty” 
among his readers (2001, 169).  Kirzner does not deal with whether it was reasonable to 
suppose that “consumer sovereignty” is an unrivaled value.  Specifically, he does not 
explore what would happen to Mises' claims under the alternative assumption that people 
value collectivism. What would “coordination” mean to them?  Suppose a social 
democrat favors the government school system relative to a voucher system, saying that it 
enhances coordination. Kirzner’s formal characteristics of coordination (rubrics II and 
III) do not help much to dispute the claim, but, more importantly, Kirzner would be 
unwilling to negotiate the substance of “coordination.” In contrast, a Smithian would 
dispute the claim but be upfront that what he deems misguided are not just narrower   58 
beliefs about specific consequences but broad beliefs as well. Most likely the social 
democrat will make claims that must drag us into a discussion of much wider 
consequences, including moral, sentimental, and cultural consequences.  
There is a web of tacit understanding and sensibility that bonds us as scholars 
trying to serve the larger purposes. We are each individual in our interpretations and 
judgments, and yet we are somewhat kindred with one another. That essential condition 
inheres at every node of discourse:  
The word I, does not, like the word man, denote a particular class of objects, 
separated from all others by peculiar qualities of their own. It is far from being the 
name of a species, but, on the contrary, whenever it is made use of, it always 
denotes a precise individual, the particular person who then speaks. It may be said 
to be, at once, both what the logicians call, a singular, and what they call, a 
common term; and to join in its signification the seemingly opposite qualities of 
the most precise individuality, and the most extensive generalization. (Smith 
1761, 219) 
 
Every economics can be thought of as the thought of some imaginary composite 
economist, and every economist is an “I”: “The words I have spoken and am yet to speak 
mean nothing: it is only I who mean something by them” (Polanyi 1962, 252). 
Kirzner’s attitude is to relegate anything loose and vague into not-economic-
science quarters. For example, when he speaks of “a possibly erroneous initial 
distribution of rights” (2000, 86), it is clear that the “erroneous” is, to his mind, 
completely separate from economic science. But is such a relegation wise? Why is 
Kirzner so sure that those quarters should exist separately and distinctly from judgments 
of coordination? By trying to relegate looseness to other quarters, Kirzner in fact ends up   59 
with brittle 100% claims surrounded by abstruse doctrine erupting with problems. It is a 
bit like managing vice: Attempts to eradicate it are vain—and discoordinative. 
If, instead, we allow more of the loose and vague in our idea of coordination and 
confess the protreptic nature of it, then our by-and-large claims will be more robust and 
we can enter more concretely and plainly into argumentation about issues, positions, and 
points with fewer worries about whether a particular concession upsets some axiom and 
fewer inhibitions about getting into waters muddied with moral, sentimental, and cultural 
consequences.  
Economists can preserve the important presumptive claim that coordination is 
advanced better by free markets than by intervention, a claim true to Hayek. It is sound to 
see both competition and entrepreneurship as being coordinative, in that they usually—
not always—bring about changes in the grand concatenation that make it better 
coordinated in the eyes of the humane mind imagined to behold it. Lower-cost firms 
replace higher-cost firms, consumers find new and better goods and services, people find 
more satisfaction in their work, and so on. Such general sensibilities help to justify Adam 
Smith’s presumption of natural liberty and ultimately entail a sense of beauty “not unlike 
that which we ascribe to any well-contrived machine” (1790, 326). Government 
intervention typically brings a variety of effects that the imagined mind regards as 
baneful.  With the indicated modifications, the coordination teachings of the Austrian 
economists remain basically true and important—but it is doubtful that they remain 
distinctively Austrian.   60 
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